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Abstract
The paper compares the welfare properties of two competing organi-
zations of the monetary system: The current fractional reserve banking
system where banks create inside money versus a narrow banking system
where inside money creation is prohibited and the money supply consists
of outside money issued by the central bank. Using a New Monetarist
model, the analysis shows that fractional reserve banking is beneficial
because of the interest payments on inside money. Since inside money
funds loans, it pays interest, compensating the agents for the inflation tax
and thus reducing the welfare costs of inflation. Narrow banking provides
no such compensation since inside money is fully backed by non-interest
bearing outside money but it offers better insurance against liquidity risk.
Welfare is higher under fractional reserve banking if banks can create a
sufficiently high amount of inside money. (JEL: E42, E51, G21)
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1 Introduction
Contemporary monetary systems are characterized by a mixture of public and
private provision of means of payment. Central banks issue cash and reserves
(outside money) and commercial banks issue demand deposits (inside money).
Demand deposits are claims on outside money redeemable on demand. Typi-
cally commercial banks issue inside money in excess of the outside money they
hold against redemptions, i.e. they create inside money and we have a fractional
reserve banking system.1 The desirability of this financial structure has been
debated throughout history and the debate revived during the recent financial
crisis.2 Opponents typically argue that fractional reserve banking brings insta-
bility without social benefits. Inside money creation should thus be prohibited
by a separation of the monetary function of banks from their other functions:
if banks issue inside money they must back it fully with very safe and liquid
assets while lending and investing must be funded by non-monetary liabilities
like long-term debt or equity. The most prominent example of such a “narrow
banking” proposal is the “Chicago plan” from 1933 which called for a full back-
ing of inside money by outside money (reserves). A similar narrow banking plan
was advocated by Friedman [1960] and related proposals were discussed after
the recent financial crisis.3
The paper analyzes the persuasiveness of such proposals, focusing on the poten-
tial benefits of fractional reserve banking that arise from inside money creation.4
A useful starting point is the quantity theory which predicts that the quantity
of money and its composition between inside and outside money is irrelevant for
the real allocation and welfare. Why should the quantity theory not apply when
banks create inside money? The paper shows that when holding money is costly
and outside money pays no interest the quantity of inside money w.r.t. outside
money matters positively for welfare. The reason are the interest payments on
inside money. Since inside money funds loans, it pays interest, compensating
the agents for the inflation tax and thus reducing the welfare costs of inflation.
This argument is developed in a standard “New Monetarist” model in the style
of Lagos and Wright [2005] as presented in Rocheteau and Nosal [2017]. There
1The main reasons are that holders of demand deposits don’t redeem all their demand
deposits at once and that banks net the the in- and outflows of demand deposits from trans-
actions vis-a-vis other banks over a clearing system. I use the terms “inside money creation”
and “fractional reserve banking system” interchangeably for a situation where commercial
banks issue more inside money than they hold outside money, i.e. they influence the money
supply.
2In Switzerland there was even a vote on a ban of inside money creation in June 2018.
3See Pennacchi [2012] for an overview.
4The instability of fractional reserve banking systems has been extensively studied in the
(microeconomic) banking literature and is quite well understood. The potential benefits of
inside money creation have received much less attention. The macroeconomic literature where
a fractional reserve banking system (with inside money being a claim on outside money) is
compared to a narrow banking system is thin despite many papers on inside or private money.
Papers most closely related to this are Sargent and Wallace [1982], Cavalcanti et al. [1999]
and Chari and Phelan [2014]. The microeconomic literature is reviewed by Pennacchi [2012].
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are consumers (buyers) and producers (sellers) and the buyers acquire money
to buy goods from the sellers. There are two kinds of money: outside money
issued by the central bank and inside money issued by perfectly competitive
commercial banks. While outside money pays no interest, inside money is an
interest-bearing claim on outside money and banks issue it against deposits in
outside money (to partially back the inside money) and as loans. A crucial
assumption is that the long run inflation rate lies above the Friedman rule.
Hence, acquiring money is costly and buyers acquire too little relative to the
social optimum. Inflation acts like a tax on real activity and this tax constitutes
the fundamental source of inefficiency in the model. Since inside money is a
claim on outside money the inflation tax affects both types of money.
In a first step (section 3) the only role of banks is to provide of liquidity, i.e. to
issue inside money. I show that inside money creation improves the allocation.
Fractional reserve banking is essential because inside money bears interest. If
more inside money is issued (w.r.t. outside money) this means more lending,
higher interest payments on bank assets (loans) and under perfect competi-
tion also on bank liabilities (inside money). Higher interest payments on inside
money induce the sellers to produce more for the same price (or to produce the
same for a lower price) and this leads buyers to acquire more inside money ex
ante. Thus the interest on inside money compensates the agents for the infla-
tion tax and reduces the welfare costs of inflation. The compensation is partial
however, because the interest on inside money is a weighted average of the bank
assets with zero nominal return (outside money) and a return equal to the in-
flation tax (loans) which is always below the inflation tax. The mechanism is
identical to an economy where the central bank would pay interest on outside
money.5 The result is reminiscent of Chari and Phelan [2014] where more inside
money is also beneficial because of higher interest payments. However, contrary
to their model, the result here has nothing to do with insurance against pref-
erence shocks. Also, there is no pecuniary externality of inside money over the
price level as in their model although agents are liquidity constrained as well.6
In a second step (section 4) I introduce another role for banks besides creating
liquidity, namely the provision of liquidity insurance. This is accomplished
by randomizing the division between buyers and sellers, i.e. by introducing
a preference shock. The uncertainty whether agents will be buyers or sellers
aggravates the basic inefficiency due to the inflation tax since now all agents
acquire money. The risk of ending up as a seller with costly idle liquidity makes
acquiring money even less attractive ex ante. In this situation the reallocation
of liquidity through banks (by intermediating liquidity from sellers to buyers)
after the shock can help because sellers can deposit their idle liquidity and
buyers can borrow additional funds. Banks can provide this service both in a
narrow banking and a fractional reserve system.
5On this see [Rocheteau and Nosal, 2017], chapter 6.2.
6Cavalcanti et al. [1999] also find that inside money creation improves welfare if outside
money is sufficiently scarce. However, there are no prices and no inflation in their model so
the welfare results seem to be driven mainly by the availability of inside or outside money.
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Now both banking systems are beneficial and for some parameter values welfare
in the fractional reserve banking system is higher while for others welfare in the
narrow banking system is higher. In the narrow banking economy banks inter-
mediate outside money from sellers to buyers and the rate on deposits equals
the inflation tax. Agents who turn out to be sellers and deposit their money
are thus fully compensated for incurring the inflation tax. As a consequence the
narrow banking economy achieves full insurance against the preference shock.
However, the basic inefficiency due to the inflation tax is not addressed since
outside money pays no interest. In the fractional reserve economy, the interest
rate for cash deposits is below the inflation tax. Thus the insurance against
liquidity risk is imperfect. However, the basic inefficiency due to the inflation
tax is partially addressed by interest on inside money. Narrow banks reallocate
liquidity more efficiently and provide better insurance against the preference
shock while fractional reserve banks create welfare increasing (interest bearing)
liquidity. If fractional reserve banks create a sufficiently high amount of inside
money (i.e. the interest on inside money is sufficiently high) the latter advantage
outweighs the former disadvantage.
It is interesting to relate these results to the way both systems generate and
distribute interest payments. In the narrow banking economy the generated
interest is fully targeted to insure agents against the preference shock. An
interest rate equal to the inflation tax is paid on the amount of outside money
deposited by sellers in banks. In the fractional reserve economy on the other
hand, interest is equally distributed over the full stock of inside money, but
at a rate below the inflation tax. Comparing welfare results in a narrow and
a fractional reserve banking economy where the interest payments per unit of
money are identical, it turns out that the allocation in the fractional reserve
economy is better. It is more efficient to pay a lower interest on the whole stock
of money than a higher, fully-compensating interest on the deposits by sellers
only. This is in the spirit of the findings by Sargent and Wallace [1982].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows the basic envi-
ronment. Then the the basic model with inside money creation (section 3) and
the model with inside money creation and liquidity insurance (section 4) are
presented.
2 environment
basic structure: The environment follows a standard model in the style of Lagos
and Wright [2005] as presented in Rocheteau and Nosal [2017] chapter 3.3. Time
is discrete and continues forever. Every period is divided into two sequential
competitive markets called first and second market.7 There is a perishable
consumption good produced and consumed in both markets denoted q in the
first market and x in the second.
7Since both markets are competitive I follow Berentsen et al. [2007] and call these markets
first and second market instead of the more common notations DM and CM.
3
agents: There is a unit mass of infinitely lived agents. Agents are of two types:
there is a mass s < 1 of sellers and a mass 1 − s of buyers.8 They discount
future periods with β and they cannot commit. In the first market sellers have
a (weakly) convex disutility of production c(q) and buyers utility of consumption
is strictly concave u(q) and satisfies the Inada-conditions. In the second market
all agents can consume and produce and they feature the quasi-linear utility
function U(x) − h. U(x) is strictly concave in x and also satisfies the Inada-
conditions.
outside money, monetary policy and prices: There is a stock M of outside
fiat money called ”cash” issued by the central bank. The cash supply evolves at
deterministic rate γ > 0, i.e. Mt = γMt−1. The growth rate of the cash supply γ
is the monetary policy tool of the central bank. She manages the cash supply by
lump-sum cash transfers or taxes τ to agents in the second market. Since agents
have unit mass the transfer/tax per agent solves τ = M −M−1 = (γ − 1)M−1.
Let p be the price of consumption good q in terms of money in the first market
and let P be the price of consumption good x in terms of outside money in the
second market. The value of one unit of outside money in the second market is
then the inverse of the price level φ = 1P . Also denote (gross) inflation pi as the
ratio of the prices between two consecutive second markets, i.e. pi = PP−1 .
banks, financial contracts and inside money : There is also an infinite amount of
perfectly competitive, profit-maximizing firms (banks). In contrast to agents,
they can commit and monitor other agents at no cost. The first property enables
them to issue debt and the second property enables them to make loans to
agents. I assume bank debt (inside money) has the following properties: a)
banks issue it in the second market and it is matures in the next second market9
b) it is a claim on cash and pays interest (rate id) and c) it has the same liquidity
properties as outside money and thus can circulate as inside money in the first
market. I assume banks have to back the inside money they issue at least with
a fraction α of outside money.
The idea behind this constraint is that transactions with inside money in the
first market generate in- and outflows of inside money between banks and to
settle and clear these flows banks need some outside money (think of reserves).
The constraint says how much outside money an average bank needs at least
to conduct these transactions. If for example a bank issued n units of inside
money she needs at least αn units of outside money. The interpretation of α is
less that of a policy parameter (reserve requirement). Rather, it captures how
sophisticated and efficient the settlement/clearing system of an average bank
or the banking system of a country works and is related to the technological
development of the financial infrastructure.
8This is to simplify comparison with section 5 where agents are uncertain about their types,
i.e. there is a preference shock which divides agents into buyers and sellers.
9With linear disutility of production in the second market there is no gain from spreading
the redemption of inside money over multiple periods. Thus assuming this kind of contracts
is not constraining in this environment.
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the role for money and banks: The role for money in this environment is mo-
tivated by limited commitment. Since agents cannot commit, buyers cannot
issue debt in the first market and sellers require immediate compensation for
the goods they produce. Buyers must give sellers ”something” if they want to
consume in the first market. This why agents (buyers) hold (inside or outside)
money.
The only role of banks in this environment is that they can issue inside money.
There is no liquidity-insurance or investment problem where they could help
(the first will be changed in section 4). The question is whether such banks can
improve the allocation compared to an economy with only outside money i.e.
whether they are essential. The equilibrium allocation of an economy with only
outside money is presented in appendix A.1.
equilibrium: Throughout the paper I focus on stationary and symmetric equi-
libria since the focus is on the long-run. In a stationary environment the value
of real balances is constant over time implying
M
P
=
M+1
P+1
.
Since the stock of cash grows at γ also the price level must grow at γ. So the
growth of the stock of cash must equal the inflation rate or pi = γ. By setting
the long-run growth rate of the stock of cash the central bank can thus also
determine long-run inflation. Thus γ can also be interpreted as the long run
inflation target of the central bank.
Throughout the paper I assume that this long-run inflation target is higher than
the discount factor, i.e. γ > β and the central bank thus does not follow the
Friedman rule. This assumption is central as it introduces a basic inefficiency
into the environment. If there is inflation above the discount factor holding
money is costly (money has a negative net return). As a consequence agents
will hold too little money for first best consumption in the first market. Inflation
acts like a tax on consumption/production in the first market (i.e. there is an
inflation tax). Since inside money is a promise on outside money the inflation
tax also applies to inside money.
first best : In a stationary environment a social planer would maximize expected
lifetime utility of all buyers and a sellers:
max
q,x
1
1− β [(1− s)u(qb)− sc(qs) + (U(x)− x)]
s.t. (1− s)qb = sqs
The first best stationary allocation thus satisfies:
5
u′(q∗)
c′( 1−ss q
∗)
= 1 (1)
U(x∗) = 1
3 A basic model of inside money creation
3.1 banks and inside money
As described in the introduction banks issue inside money in the second market.
What do they acquire with it? Since they must hold at least a fraction α of the
inside money they issue in outside money (reserve constraint)10 they want to
acquire outside money in the form of cash deposits. The only other asset they
can acquire are loans from agents. Similar to inside money I assume bank loans
are made in the second market and paid back in the next second market with
interest rate i and denominated in outside money. A representative bank thus
maximizes the value of her assets (cash and loans) minus the value of liabilities
(issued inside money) in the second market s.t. having enough cash to satisfy
the reserve constraint. If d are the cash deposits and l are the loans per client
(in equilibrium this will only be buyers) the problem of a representative bank
is:
max
l,d
= d+ lb(1 + i)− (l + d)(1 + id) (2)
s.t. α(l + d) ≤ d (3)
If there is an interest rate spread (i > id) and if the interest on inside money is
positive (id > 0) the bank would like to make a loan as big as possible and to
have as little cash deposits as possible. Conjecturing that this will be true in
equilibrium the reserve constraint will bind and the bank will not hold excess-
reserves. Denoting total inside money issued per client as n = l + d this means
the share of cash in the bank balance sheet d/n is just α and the share of loans
l/n is 1−α. We get the following relationship between loans and cash deposits
l =
1− α
α
d (4)
We see that the loan size increases exponentially as α decreases for a given d.
If α is 0.5 the bank can make loans of d but if α = 0.25 the bank can make
loans of 3d. Where does this exponential growth come from? Suppose the bank
wants to increase the loan size by 1. How much more cash does the bank need
10In the appendix A.2 I present a model where this constraint arises from redemptions from
inside to outside money before the first market.
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to back this loan expansion? Suppose that α = 0.5 i.e. for every issued unit of
inside money the bank needs 0.5 units of cash. So if loans increase by 1 the bank
needs 0.5 additional units of cash in a first step. But if this cash is deposited
the bank issues additional 0.5 units of inside money. To back this inside money
the bank needs again a fraction α of it in cash so 0.5 ∗ 0.5 = 0.25 units. But
if this cash is deposited the bank again issues additional inside money and so
on and in the end the initial increase in loans from 1 triggers a cash need of
0.5 + 0.25 + 0.125 + ... = 1 units of cash. If the bank issues one unit of inside
money as a loan this triggers an infinite sum of subsequent cash acquisitions
who converge to α1−α . Clearly this sum is exponentially lowered if α decreases.
For example if α = 0.25 the bank needs only 1/3 units of cash if she wants to
increase the loan size by one. This exponential decrease in the necessary cash
holdings when α decreases gives rise to the exponential increase in the loan size.
Using the binding reserve constraint we can rewrite the objective function as:
max
n
n(α+ (1− α)(1 + i)− (1 + id))
In equilibrium free entry implies banks will enter until they earn zero profits
and thus the following relationship between interest on inside money and the
loan rate must hold in equilibrium:
1 + id = α+ (1− α)(1 + i) (5)
So the interest rate on inside money is a weighted average of the return on cash
(1 in nominal terms) and the return on loans (1 + i). Consequently the interest
on inside money must be below the loan rate so there is a spread if α > 0 (the
first conjecture was correct). We also see that the interest on inside money
negatively depends on α. Remember that α denotes the share of cash in the
bank balance sheet d/n. So if α increases the share assets with no return (cash)
in a bank’s balance sheet increases and the share of assets with return (loans)
decreases. Consequently the bank can pay less interest on its liabilities. Both
effects are shown graphically in the figure below.
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In the left case α is big. The bank needs to back the issued inside money with a
lot of cash and as a consequence the amount of loans she can make is small. This
bank has a lot of assets with no return (cash) and relatively little assets with
returns (loans). So in this case we have a lower interest on inside money (taking
the interest on loans as given) and a bigger spread between loan rate and the
rate on inside money. In the right case α is low. the bank has a lot of assets with
returns (loans) compared to assets with no returns (cash). Therefore interest
rates on loans and inside money will be much closer together (lower spread) and
the interest on inside money is higher. If α is so small that the share of cash
becomes negligible the bank would pay practically the same interest rates on
loans and banknotes.
For illustration and completeness I also consider the corner cases when α = 1
and α = 0. If α = 1 this means that the bank must store all cash deposited.
This bank cannot make any loans and the balance sheet just consists of cash
and inside money issued against cash deposits. Since cash does not pay any
(nominal) return the bank cannot pay any interest on the inside money issued
and under zero profits id = 0. This would be a narrow banking economy.
On the other hand if α = 0 the bank would need no cash to issue inside money.
If the interest rate on banknotes is positive banks don’t hold cash anymore and
they would only issue loans. Their assets would then consist of only loans. In
this case zero profits implies that the loan rate and the rate on banknotes are
equal, i.e. i = id.
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3.2 second market
We now turn to the question how much money agents want to hold. I make two
simplifying conjectures which will be verified in equilibrium: First I conjecture
that if holding money is costly only buyers will acquire it. I thus focus on
a representative buyer problem in the second market. Second, I focus on the
case where buyers only acquire inside money and no outside money. In the
appendix A.3 I show that buyers will do this if the interest on inside money (id)
is positive (so this is in line with the conjecture already used in the banking
problem). Note that if buyers only hold inside money this also implies that only
banks hold outside money in this economy.
As laid out above a buyer has two possibilities to acquire inside money in the
second market. She can deposit cash in the bank (denoted d) which the bank
needs to fulfill the reserve requirement or she can borrow inside money (denoted
l). If agents borrow they get inside money now and pay back in the next second
market with interest i. So either agents work today to acquire inside money
or they work tomorrow. The amount of inside money an agent brings into the
next period is the sum of cash deposits and loans i.e. n+1 = d+ l. The problem
of a buyer arriving in the second market with n units of inside money and l−1
debt from last period is thus:
W (n, l−1) = max
x,h,d,l
U(x)− h+ βV (
=n+1︷︸︸︷
d+ l, l) (6)
s.t. x+ φd = h+ φτ + nφ(1 + id)− l−1φ(1 + i)
The first-order condition for optimal consumption in the second market is
U ′(x∗) = 1 (this also applies to sellers)11 and optimal cash deposits and op-
timal borrowing solve:12
φ = βVn+1(n+1, l) (7)
Vl(n+1, l) = Vn+1(n+1, l)− φ+1(1 + i+1) = 0 (8)
11For this conclusion to hold we need to apply a scaling condition to U(..) s.t. x∗ = U
′−1(1)
is big enough that the amount sellers work hs is always positive, see [Berentsen et al., 2007]
proof of proposition 1. I will assume such a condition is always satisfied.
12Since any meaningful equilibrium must have positive cash holdings and positive loans by
banks I focus on interior solutions. The partial derivatives of the value functions are denoted
with subscripts, e.g.
∂V (n+1,l)
∂n+1
= Vn+1(n+1, l).
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This means buyers must be indifferent between both forms of acquiring inside
money. As a consequence in any equilibrium the loan rate must equal the
inflation tax or:
φ
φ+1
1
β
= 1 + i+1 (9)
Finally, the value of bringing an additional unit of inside money in the second
market and the marginal value of borrowing last period are:
Wn(n, l−1) = φ(1 + id) (10)
Wl−1(n, l−1) = −φ(1 + i) (11)
And the market clearing conditions for the output good, cash deposits and
borrowing are:13
(1− s)hb + shs = (1− s)xb + sxs = x∗ (12)
(1− s)d = M (13)
(1− s)l = (1− s)1− α
α
d =
1− α
α
M (14)
3.3 first market
With inside money used in the first market a representative buyer with n units
of inside money solves the following problem:
Vb(n, l−1) = max
qb
u(qb) +W (n− pqb, l−1)
s.t. pqb ≤ n
Using that the marginal value of inside money is φ(1+id) from (10) and defining
q∗ as the quantity consumed if the liquidity-constraint is slack (i.e. q∗ solves
u′(q∗) = pφ(1 + id)) the solution for optimal consumption and the marginal
value of inside money is:
{qb, Vb,n(n, l−1)} =

{q∗, φ(1 + id)} if n ≥ pq∗
{np , u
′(n/p)
p } if n < pq∗
(15)
A representative seller with no inside money holdings (and also no borrowing)
solves:
13The first expression uses the fact that both buyers and sellers will consume the same
amount x∗ in the second market. The second expression uses the conjecture that only buyers
deposit outside money and in the end all outside money will be held by banks. And the third
expression uses the binding reserve constraint of the bank (56).
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Vs(0, 0) = max
qs
−c(qs) +W (pq, 0)
with the solution:
c′(qs) = pφ(1 + id) (16)
Since inside money pays interest sellers incorporate this in their working deci-
sion.
Finally market clearing in the first market is given by:
sqs = (1− s)qb (17)
3.4 equilibrium
To solve for the stationary equilibrium allocation I conjecture that a buyer is
liquidity constrained if γ > β i.e. that we are in the lower case of (15). Optimal
inside money holdings of buyers then solve:
φ = βVn+1(n+1, l) = β
u′(q+1)
p+1
(18)
If we combine this with the seller optimality condition (16) and apply γ =
φ/φ+1 (stationarity) we can get equilibrium consumption in the first market as
a function of the inflation tax and the interest on inside money:
u′(qb)
c′(qs)
=
γ
β
1
1 + id
(19)
Note that the expression is identical to the allocation in an economy without
banks (A.1) except for the interest rate on inside money. And also note that
first market consumption depends positively on this interest rate. The closer
the interest on inside money to the inflation tax, the closer consumption in the
first market to first best consumption q∗.14
Next I derive equilibrium interest rates. To get the equilibrium loan rate I apply
γ = φ/φ+1 to the indifference condition between both forms of inside money (9).
The loan rate must equal the inflation tax and is thus independent of α. The
14Under the assumptions made on preferences,
u′(q)
c′(q) decreases in q so if the RHS of (19)
is bigger than 1 it must be that qb < q
∗
b (see A.1). This logic applies to all the comparative
statics in the models used. Every change in parameters which brings the RHS closer to 1 is
welfare improving because it gets closer to the first best allocation q∗ where u
′(q∗)
c′(q∗) = 1.
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interest on inside money is then the weighted average of the loan rate and the
return on cash from the zero profit condition of banks (5) and is thus decreasing
in α. Thus equilibrium interest rates are
1 + i =
γ
β
(20)
1 + id = (1− α)γ
β
+ α (21)
and we get the following picture for the evolution of the interest rates as a
function of α:
We saw that α is the share of cash to total bank assets (and 1−α is the share of
loans). So if α increases this means the share of assets with no nominal return
(cash) increases vis a vis the share of assets with a positive nominal return
(loans). In equilibrium the return on loans is independent of α so consequently
the bank can pay less interest on its liabilities if the asset-mix shifts towards
assets with no return (cash). As described in the section on banks, an increase
in α leads to a very strong increase in the amount of cash banks need to hold
if they want to make additional loans. Thus lending reacts very strongly to
changes in α.
To get equilibrium consumption in the first market I combine 19 with the equi-
librium expression for the interest on inside money to get and market clearing
17:
u′(qb)
c′( 1−ss qb)
=
γ/β
(1− α)γ/β + α (22)
The following proposition summarizes the most important results:
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Proposition 1. Suppose holding money is costly (i.e. γ > β) and the reserve
constraint is interior (i.e. α ∈ (0, 1)), then there is a unique stationary equilib-
rium of an economy with banks and inside money in which:
i) first market consumption solves (22)
ii) first market consumption is below first best q∗ and the inefficiency increases
in the inflation tax γ/β and the reserve constraint α.15
iii) the allocation is better than in an economy without banks (see A.1), i.e.
banks and inside money creation are essential.
iv) as α→ 1 (the economy becomes a narrow banking economy) the allocation
approaches an economy without banks as in A.1.
v) as α→ 0 outside money is not used anymore and the allocation approaches
the first best allocation (1).
Several results of this proposition are worth highlighting. First, the proposition
shows a non-neutrality result with respect to inside money (ii)). The more
inside money relative to cash (the lower α) the higher welfare. Thus the quantity
theory does not hold with respect to inside money in this economy. This implies,
second, that banks with the only function of inside money creation are essential,
i.e. they improve the allocation compared to an economy without banks and
inside money creation (iii)). I will explain these results in more detail in the next
section. The proposition also says that if banks don’t have a liquidity creating
function, i.e. if α = 1 and they are narrow banks, the allocation is the same as
without banks (iv)).We saw that if α = 1 banks cannot offer any loans and they
cannot pay interest on inside money either. This implies buyers cannot borrow
and there is no benefit from depositing cash in banks compared to holding
cash directly since both have the same liquidity properties. In fact inside and
outside money are identical in such an economy and thus the allocation must
be equivalent to an economy without banks where buyers directly acquire cash.
Narrow banks offer no social benefits and are not essential in this environment.
If the only role of banks is inside money creation and if narrow banking prohibits
inside money creation it should be that a narrow banking system is equivalent
to a system without banks.
Finally a few comments on the equilibrium if α = 0 (v). In the section on banks
we saw that for positive interest rates on inside money banks will not hold any
cash and interest rates on loans and inside money will be equalized under zero
profits, i.e. i = id. In an equilibrium where banks don’t demand cash deposits,
also the supply of cash deposits must be zero. Thus it must be that buyers want
to borrow but they don’t want to make cash deposits. The condition for this to
happen is that the condition for borrowing in (7) is interior but the marginal
15It is a standard feature of models in the tradition of Lagos and Wright [2005] that second
market consumption is always at first best. Thus for welfare comparisons between different
models it is sufficient to focus on the first market. This holds also for the models in the next
sections.
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costs of depositing are higher than the marginal benefits i.e.:
φ > βVn+1(n+1, l) = βφ+1(1 + i+1)
Thus in a stationary equilibrium buyers borrow but don’t deposit if the loan
rate is below the inflation tax:
γ
β
> 1 + i. (23)
Any (positive) interest rate satisfying 23 would be an equilibrium if α = 0. In
such an economy outside money has no function anymore. Because the interest
on borrowing and the interest on inside money are identical buyers are never
liquidity constrained and their holdings of inside money can be anything from
the quantity to consume the first best to infinity, i.e. n ∈ (pq∗,∞).16 The
economy achieves the first best allocation equivalent to an economy with direct
credit.
3.5 the non-neutrality of inside money
Why is more inside money (a lower α) beneficial? Above I explained how a
lower α leads to strong increases in lending and a shift in the asset-mix of banks
from assets with no return (cash) to return bearing assets (loans) which allows
banks to pay higher interest on inside money. This is beneficial because this
interest (partially) compensates the agents for the inflation tax, which is the
basic inefficiency in the economy. Since the equilibrium interest rate on inside
money is below the inflation tax in equilibrium (1+id < γ/β) this compensation
is always partial. The mechanism is identical to an economy with only outside
money where the central bank pays interest on cash in the second market.17
To see the beneficial effects of higher interest on inside money more clearly look
at supply and demand for the consumption good in the first market. Equilibrium
supply from the seller side is implicitly defined by optimal production (16),
c′(q) = pφ(1 + id), and equilibrium demand is given by the buyer optimality
condition u′(q) = γ/βpφ = (1+i)pφ. From the properties of the utility functions
we can infer that supply (weakly) increases in the relative price pφ and in the
interest inside money id and demand decreases in the relative price pφ and in
the loan rate. From this the effects of the changes in interest rates through α
on equilibrium production/consumption can be inferred. We saw above that a
decrease in α increases interest on inside money thus supply shifts up. Sellers
want to produce more for the same relative price because they get more interest
in the next second market. The following figure depicts this shift from initial
supply S(α1) to the new supply curve S(α2) for a decrease in α from an arbitrary
16The definition of inside money as a claim on outside money may seem strange in an
economy where only inside money is used
17The equilibrium allocation of an economy with interest on outside money is given by
u′(q)
c′(q) =
γ
β
1
1+im
where 1 + im is the gross interest on cash by the central bank, see Rocheteau
and Nosal [2017] p.140. Note that this expression is exactly identical to equation 22.
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value α1 to a lower value α2. The figure shows that as a result of this change
equilibrium consumption (and production) will clearly increase.
Figure 1: The equilibrium effects of an increase in interest of
inside money
How can we see this non-neutrality from a quantity theory perspective? Look
at the inside money n = l+ d a buyer brings to the first market. In equilibrium
no cash is held outside banks so the amount of cash deposits in banks must
equal the stock of cash in the economy or d = M/(1− s) from (13). Therefore
the inside money holdings of a buyer are n = Mα(1−s) . Equilibrium consumption
in the first market can then be written as:
qb =
n
p
=
M/(α(1− s))
p
(24)
If the quantity theory would hold with respect to inside money this would imply
that the price level in the first market rises 1 : 1 with the amount of inside money
available for the buyer. For example if α decreases from 0.5 to 0.25 the amount of
inside money available for a buyer n doubles. If the quantity theory would hold,
we would expect the price level to increase by the same factor and consumption
would not change. However, this is not what happens in this economy. We saw
that over the changes in interest rates a reduction in α leads to an increase in
qb. So equation 24 can only hold if the price level in the first market rises less
than the amount of inside money available (M/(α(1− s)).
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4 Inside money creation and liquidity insurance
In the preceding section we saw that the inside money creation is beneficial
because of the interest on inside money. In this section I want to ad another
role for banks besides creating liquidity, the provision of liquidity insurance, and
see how this affects the results from section 3.
4.1 changes in the environment
liquidity risk : Following Berentsen et al. [2007] (BCW in the following) a liquid-
ity insurance role for banks can be introduced by two simple modifications to the
environment: The first is to make the division into buyers and sellers random
from the perspective of agents, i.e. to introduce a preference shock. Now agents
ex-ante don’t know whether they will be buyers or sellers in the first market.
With probability s an agent is a seller in the first market and with the inverse
probability 1 − s an agent is a buyer. If acquiring liquidity is costly (which is
the case here since γ > β) then there is room for the reallocation of liquidity
through banks after this shock. But to make this possible the interaction of
banks and agents must be after the shock. This is done by the insertion of a
banking period after the preference shock. Contracts between banks and agents
(bank debt and loans) are now formed in this banking period and are redeemed
in the second market (before: from second market to second market). This is the
second modification. Thus the sequence of events in one period is now as follows:
t→ preference shock→ banking period→ first market→ second market→ t+1
What are the implications of the introduction of this preference shock? In
appendix A.4 I show that introducing a preference shock into an economy with
only outside money worsens the allocation compared to the allocation without
preference shock and only outside money in appendix A.1. If acquiring money
is costly, the risk to be a seller with (costly) idle liquidity in the first market
makes acquiring money even less attractive ex-ante. So the uncertainty from the
preference shock aggravates the basic inefficiency from the inflation tax. The
introduction of a preference shock has no formal implications for the first best
allocation (1). The objective function of the social planer is now interpreted as
expected lifetime utility of a representative agent under stationarity.
two banking regimes: Due to the introduction of liquidity risk banks can have
two roles now: the creation of liquidity and the insurance against liquidity risk.
How should we think of fractional reserve banking and narrow banking in this
extended environment? In the introduction I defined a narrow banking regime
as a banking system where inside money creation is prohibited but banks can
perform other functions like intermediation if they don’t finance them with
inside money. In the model environment this is equivalent to an economy with
only outside money where the money supply is fully controlled by the central
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bank.18 Thus in the narrow banking regime there will be only outside money
but banks can intermediate this from sellers to buyers. This economy is a basic
version of BCW.19 In contrast to this in a fractional reserve banking system
banks operate as before: they issue inside money against cash deposits and
loans subject to a reserve constraint. So in this economy banks have both roles:
they provide liquidity and they provide liquidity insurance.
In the following I solve the model under each of these two regimes taking the
regime as exogenous, i.e. I assume that banks and agents cannot decide on the
regime. The basic question is again: is fractional reserve banking essential?
Does it improve the allocation with regard to narrow banking?
4.2 Fractional reserve banking
Banks are now active from the banking period to the second market. This
means agents can only acquire outside money in the second market. Then, in
the banking period after the preference shock, agents can deposit this outside
money and borrow. Again banks issue inside money against cash deposits d
and loans l (at rate i) and inside money is redeemed with interest in the second
market with interest id. The sequence of events is summarized in the following
graph:
4.2.1 second market
A representative agent (which may have been a buyer or a seller in the first
market before) may bring outside money (m) inside money n and some debt l
into the second market. He chooses consumption x, work h and his new holdings
of outside money m+1. Note that now, since agents face the uncertainty of the
preference shock, V (m+1) denotes the expected value of entering the next period
with m+1 units of outside money.
W (m,n, l) = max
x,h,m+1
U(x)− h+ βV (m+1) (25)
s.t. x+ φm+1 = h+ φ(τ +m) + nφ(1 + id)− lφ(1 + i)
18The narrow banking allocation in the preceding section was the same as an economy with
only outside money, see proposition 1 iv)
19In footnote 9 in BCW the authors also make the interpretation of their model as a narrow
banking economy.
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The first order condition for optimal consumption is again U ′(x∗) = 1 and
optimal (positive) outside money holdings solve:
φ = βV ′(m+1) = (1− s)V ′b (m+1) + sV ′s (m+1). (26)
Both first-order conditions imply that agents want to work such that they con-
sume the same amount x∗ in the second market and they choose the same
amount of cash to bring into the next period - independent of m, d and l. These
properties follow from the quasi-linear utility function introduced by Lagos and
Wright [2005]. The expected marginal value of outside money is the marginal
value of outside money as a buyer V ′b (m+1) times the marginal value as a seller
V ′s (m+1) weighted with the respective probabilities. The envelope conditions to
the problem are:
Wm = φ
Wd = φ(1 + id)
Wl = −φ(1 + i)
4.2.2 banking period and first market
Again I focus on the case where agents use only inside money in the first market
referring to appendix A.3. Also, since after the preference shock all uncertainty
is resolved, the problem of the banking period and the first market for buyers
or sellers can be taken together.
buyer problem
A buyer arrives with m units of outside money in the banking period. There he
decides how much of this he should deposit (db, where db ≤ m) and how much
he should borrow lb. Then, in the first market he chooses how much to consume
qb given the amount of inside money n = db + lb he has.
Vb(m) = max
qb,lb,db
u(qb) +W (m− db, lb + db − pqb, lb)
s.t. pqb ≤ db + lb
db ≤ m
First it is clear that if inside money is used in the first market a buyer should
deposit all his cash in the bank. No matter whether he is liquidity constrained in
the first market (i.e. the first constraint binds) he is always better off depositing
the cash if interest is positive. So we must have db = m. The solution to the
problem is then.
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{q, l} =

{q∗,∈ (pq∗ −m,∞)} if i = id,m < pq∗
{m+lp , l > 0 solves u′(m+lp ) = pφ(1 + i)} if i > id, u′(mp ) 1p > φ(1 + i)
{mp , l = 0} if i > id, u′(mp ) 1p ≤ φ(1 + i)
(27)
We have tree possible situations. In the first, the loan rate and the interest
on inside money are the same, i = id. This means from the perspective of a
buyer borrowing is costless and buyers can acquire as much inside money as
they like. Consequently consumption is at first best q∗ and borrowing is in
the interval (pq∗ − m,∞).20 In the second situation borrowing is costly, i.e.
the loan rate is above the interest on inside money or i > id but the amount
of outside money is sufficiently small (or borrowing is sufficiently cheap) that
buyers still want to borrow.21 In this situation a buyer will never have enough
inside money for first-best consumption. In the third situation a buyer is also
liquidity constrained but the amount of outside money is sufficiently high (or
borrowing is so expensive) that he prefers bringing outside money and depositing
it over borrowing. From the banking problem we already know that the loan
rate must be above the interest rate on inside money (see above). So we are in
situations two or three. Since any meaningful equilibrium should have positive
loans I will also conjecture that the conditions for the second situation are
satisfied in equilibrium and later verify that they hold.
In situation 2 the marginal value of cash for a buyer in the first market V ′b (m)
is equal to
V ′b (m) =
u′(m+lp )
p
= φ(1 + i) (28)
seller problem
A representative seller solves the following problem in a RC-economy:
Vs(m) = max
qs,ls,ds
−c(qs) +W (m− ds, ds + ls + pqs, ls)
s.t. ds ≤ m
ls ≥ 0
20We still know from before that if acquiring money is costly, γ > β a buyer will never bring
enough outside money for first best consumption q∗ so we must have m < pq∗.
21The second condition says that the marginal benefits of borrowing are higher than the
marginal costs.
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It can easily be shown that a seller will not borrow if i > id, so ls = 0 and
he will deposit all the outside money he brings if id > 0, so ds = m. Also
optimal production is again given by equalizing marginal disutility of work with
marginal utility given by 16. The marginal value of outside money for a seller
in the first market V ′s (m) is equal to the marginal value of inside money in the
next second market (since he deposits it).
V ′s (m) = φ(1 + id) (29)
Market clearing in the first market is still given by (17).
optimal cash holdings
We can iterate (28) and (29) one period forward and use them in (26) to get
a more intuitive expression for the optimal holdings of outside money. The
marginal costs of acquiring it must equal the weighted average of the two interest
rates which denote the marginal utilities of outside money as a buyer and a seller.
φ = βφ+1[(1− s)(1 + i+1) + s(1 + id+1)]. (30)
banks
The bank problem is essentially the same as in the economy without preference
shock. As before I express the problem in per buyer terms. The only difference
is that now also sellers deposit and thus the market clearing for cash deposits
must also take into account the sellers and d now denotes the amount of cash
deposits of a bank per buyer (and not of a buyer). Still we get a binding reserve
constraint for i > id > 0 so (56) and (5) must hold here too. Again the interest
on inside money is the average of the return on loans (1 + i) and the return on
cash weighted by the relative shares of these assets:
1 + id = α+ (1− α)(1 + i)
The market for loans and cash deposits clears as follows:
(1− s)l = 1− α
α
(1− s)d = 1− α
α
((1− s)db + sds) (31)
4.2.3 equilibrium
Using stationarity (γ = φ/φ+1) on optimal outside money holdings of agents
(30) we get that the weighted average of both interest rates must equal the
inflation tax:
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γβ
= (1− s)(1 + i) + s(1 + id) (32)
Note that given a level of the inflation tax this optimality condition introduces a
negative relationship between both interest rates. The higher the loan rate the
lower the interest on inside money must be and the other way round, otherwise
supply and demand for outside money would not be in balance. Now I combine
this with the free entry condition of banks, (5), to get equilibrium interest rates:
1 + id =
(1− α)γ/β + α(1− s)
1− αs (33)
1 + i =
γ/β − αs
1− αs (34)
Compared to the interest rates in the economy without preference shock we get
two differences: The loan rate is now a positive function of α. The higher α
the higher the equilibrium loan rate. This is a consequence of the negative rela-
tionship between loan rate and interest on inside money introduced by optimal
outside money holdings (32). If α increases this decreases the interest on inside
money payable given the loan rate over the zero profit condition of banks. But
at this lower interest on inside money the demand for outside money would be
0 and thus the loan rate must rise. Second, comparing the interest on inside
money in (33) with the analogue expression for the economy without preference
shock (20) we see that for any given α the interest on inside money is higher
in the economy with preference shock than without. The following figure shows
these two differences (the dashed lines are the interest rates of the economy
without preference shock).
Note that for α ∈ (0, 1) interest rates always satisfy i > id > 0 and thus the
conjectures for buyer, seller and bank behaviour were correct. To get equilibrium
consumption in the first market I insert the expressions for equilibrium interest
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rates into optimal consumption in situation 2 in equation (27) and use optimal
seller production (16).
u′(qb)
c′( 1−ss qb)
=
1 + i
1 + id
=
γ/β − αs
(1− α)γ/β + α(1− s) (35)
We get the following proposition for an economy with inside money creation
and a preference shock:
Proposition 2. Suppose holding money is costly (i.e. γ > β) and the reserve
constraint is interior (i.e. α ∈ (0, 1)), then there is a unique stationary equilib-
rium with inside money creation in which:
i) first market consumption solves (35)
ii) first market consumption is below first best consumption q∗ and the ineffi-
ciency increases in the inflation tax γ/β, the reserve constraint α and the
fraction of sellers in the economy s.
iii) the allocation is worse than in the inside money creation economy without
preference shock in proposition 1.
iv) the allocation is better than without banks as in A.4 and approaches this
allocation as α→ 1.
v) as α→ 0 outside money is not used anymore and the allocation approaches
the first best allocation.
What are the new insights from this proposition compared to proposition 1? Let
me first highlight the similarities. First, the non-neutrality result with respect
to inside money is also present here (ii)). The more inside money (the lower
α) the higher welfare. Second, we also get the result that as α goes to 0 the
allocation is efficient (outside money is not used anymore). Also, fractional
reserve banking is essential, i.e. the allocation is better than without banks
(iv)). The new thing is the preference shock which matters negatively. The
higher the fraction of sellers in the economy (or alternatively the higher the risk
to be a seller) the lower welfare. I will give an interpretation for this below. Note
that the preference shock is also the reason why the economy with preference
shock is worse than without (iii)). As s goes to zero the allocation approaches
proposition 1).
What can we say with regard to the comparison to a narrow banking regime?
The proposition says that as α goes to 1 (all banks are narrow banks) the allo-
cation is like without banks so banks have no socially useful role (vi)). However,
we must be cautious before concluding that this is also the allocation of a narrow
banking regime. A narrow banking regime prohibits only inside money creation
but not the other functions of banks (as long as their liabilities don’t circulate
as inside money). Specifically, as shown in BCW, banks can still intermediate
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outside money from sellers to buyers in a narrow banking regime. In the next
section I will characterize the allocation of such an economy. As it turns out,
narrow banking is also essential with preference shock (the allocation is better
than without banks) and the welfare comparison between fractional reserve and
narrow banking depends on parameters.
4.3 Narrow banking
As I argued in the beginning of the section a narrow banking economy where
inside money creation is prohibited is equivalent to an economy where only
outside money is used.22 The biggest changes are in the banking sector. Banks
cannot issue inside money anymore so the only thing they can do is intermediate
outside money from sellers to buyers. As BCW show in this economy sellers
deposit cash in the banking sector (if interest rates on these deposits are positive)
and buyers borrow cash. So we can write the cash profits of a representative
bank in per buyer-terms as value of assets minus value of liabilities (d are again
the cash deposits per buyer and l are the cash loans per buyer) subject to
a feasibility constraint that the bank cannot make more loans than the cash
deposited.
max
lb,d
= lb(1 + i)− d(1 + id)
s.t. lb ≤ d
It is clear that the bank should lend out all cash deposited if i > id (w.l.o.g.
also if i = id). Free entry implies zero profits which equalizes the interest rates.
i = id (36)
So in contrast to the economy with inside money creation there is no spread
between the loan rate and the rate on cash deposits anymore. Finally mar-
ket clearing for loans and deposits implies (already presuming that only sellers
deposit):
(1− s)lb = sds (37)
4.3.1 equilibrium
As BCW show the condition for optimal cash holdings in the second market for
agents is identical to the one in the fractional reserve banking system (32). So
22Since such an economy is a basic version of BCW I only highlight the most important
differences to the fractional reserve banking economy and direct the interested reader to their
paper for details.
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combining this with the zero profit condition of banks (36) we get that both
interest rates must equal the inflation tax or
1 + i = 1 + id =
γ
β
(38)
Since I focus on the case where γ > β, interest rates are positive and thus buyers
are liquidity constrained in the first market and sellers strictly prefer to deposit
all their cash. As BCW (p. 180) show equilibrium consumption in the first
market is given by:
u′(qb)
c′( 1−ss qb)
= 1 + i =
γ
β
. (39)
Proposition 3. Suppose holding money is costly (i.e. γ > β) then there is a
unique stationary equilibrium of a narrow banking economy in which:
i) first market consumption solves (39)
ii) first market consumption is below first best consumption q∗ and the ineffi-
ciency increases in the inflation tax γ/β.
iii) the allocation is identical to the allocation without preference shock and only
outside money in appendix A.1.
iv) the allocation is better than the allocation with outside money and preference
shock in appendix A.4 (no banks).
The proposition shows that narrow banking is essential (iv)). So what is the
welfare gain from narrow banking? They are useful because they perfectly insure
agents against the preference shock. The easiest way to see this is by verifying
that the allocation of the narrow banking model is exactly the same as in an
economy without preference shock and banks (iii)). The intuition is that since
the deposit rate exactly equals the inflation tax (1 + id =
γ
β ) in the narrow
banking economy agents that turn out to be sellers are perfectly compensated
for the inflation tax on the cash they acquired. So the risk of being a seller who
cannot use the cash acquired before disappears and the allocation-worsening role
of the preference shock is eliminated. Narrow banks can be seen as a substitute
for a market to borrow/lend cash after the preference shock.23
4.4 Fractional reserves vs. narrow banking
In the preceding section it was established that in the economy with fractional
reserves there is an equilibrium like the one without banks if α = 1 and if α = 0
the allocation is efficient. Also it was shown that welfare increases as α gets
smaller. In the narrow banking economy it was established that the allocation is
23See [Rocheteau and Nosal, 2017], chapter 8.5 for this equivalence.
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better than without banks. It is thus natural to ask at which reserve constraint
α˜ welfare is the same in the narrow banking and in the fractional reserve banking
system. We get the following proposition:
Proposition 4. There is a threshold value α˜ = γ/βγ/β+s > 0.5 where welfare in the
fractional reserve banking economy is identical to the narrow banking economy.
If α > α˜ welfare in the narrow banking economy is higher and if α < α˜ welfare
in the fractional reserve banking economy is higher.
In the model without preference shock fractional reserve banking always domi-
nated narrow banking because it allowed interest payments on inside money (see
proposition 1). Now, with preference shock, we get a threshold result. Why is
this? What is the disadvantage of fractional reserve banking if there is liquidity
risk? The answer is that in contrast to narrow banking the insurance against
the preference shock is imperfect with fractional reserve banking. We saw that
in the narrow banking economy the equilibrium interest rate for cash deposits
equals the inflation tax or 1 + id = γ/β and thus sellers are fully compensated
for the inflation tax on the cash they bring into the period. This is not the case
in the fractional reserve banking economy. There we saw that the equilibrium
interest rate for cash deposits (with equals the interest on inside money) is be-
low the inflation tax or 1 + id < γ/β. Thus insurance against the preference
shock is imperfect and this is the reason why the narrow banking economy can
be better in terms of welfare.
How can we interpret the threshold α˜? Remember that the relative advantage of
fractional reserve banking is the provision of interest. This advantage is specially
valuable if the inflation tax is high. So the higher the inflation tax the more
likely is the fractional reserve system better than the narrow banking system.
This is why α˜ increases with the inflation tax. Second, interest payments are
negatively related to α. The lower α the higher interest payments on inside
money. This increases the relative advantage of fractional reserves. Lastly there
is the preference shock or the risk of becoming a seller in the first market s.
Clearly perfect insurance against this risk is more valuable if the risk is high
(s is high). Thus it makes sense that α˜ decreases in s. The higher this risk,
the more likely is the narrow banking system to be better than the fractional
reserve banking system. Note that α˜ must be above 0.5 since this is the number
reached as γ/β → 1 and s→ 1. So for any α < 0.5 fractional reserves is always
better.
At this point one might ask the following question: In the narrow banking
economy we saw that interest on deposited cash was exactly equal to the inflation
tax or 1+ id =
γ
β . So since agents seem to be fully compensated for the inflation
tax why don’t we achieve efficiency there? The point is that in the narrow
banking economy interest is only paid on the cash deposited in banks and not
on the whole stock of outside money. More precisely, interest is paid on the
cash not used as means of payments. It only applies to a fraction s of the
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total stock of cash deposited by sellers. The following figure highlights this
difference. In the narrow banking economy we have a full compensation against
the inflation tax on the cash deposited by sellers (fraction s of the total stock).
In the fractional reserve banking economy we have a partial compensation of
the inflation tax (because 1 + id is below the inflation tax) on the full stock of
inside money.
Figure 2: Interest under narrow and fractional reserve banking
Interest in the narrow banking economy is fully targeted to insure agents against
the preference shock but the basic inefficiency in the environment - the inflation
tax - is not addressed. In the fractional reserve banking economy the basic
inefficiency (inflation tax) is partially addressed by the interest on inside money.
However, since this interest rate is below the inflation tax, imperfect insurance
against the preference shock is reintroduced.
Which system is more efficient if the interest payments per unit of money are
the same in both systems? In the narrow banking economy the total amount
of interest generated is the total amount of loans (1 − s)lb times the interest
payment which in equilibrium equals i = γ/β − 1. In equilibrium total loans
equal sM from equation (37). So total interest per unit of money in the narrow
banking economy is s(γ/β−1). In the fractional reserve banking economy total
loans in equilibrium equal 1−αα M from loan market clearing (31) and the loan
rate payments i are given by equation (33). Total inside money in equilibrium
N = M + L then equals M/α. Thus total interest payments per unit of inside
money in the fractional reserve banking economy are
Li
N
=
1− α
α
M
α
M
(γ/β − 1)
(1− αs) =
(1− α)(γ/β − 1)
1− αs
which equals id in (33) as it should be. Now we can find a threshold αˆ where
interest payments per unit of money are the same in both systems. It solves
s(γ/β − 1) = (1− αˆ)(γ/β − 1)
1− αˆs
which is
αˆ =
1− s
1− s2
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Comparing this threshold with α˜ from proposition 4 where welfare in both
regimes is identical we find that α˜ > αˆ for γ/β > 1. Thus at αˆ where the
interest payments per unit of money are the same in both systems welfare is
higher in the fractional reserve system than in the narrow banking system. It
is more efficient to pay a lower interest rate on the whole stock of money than
a higher, fully-compensating interest rate on part of the money stock.
4.5 Two types of debt
So far there was the implicit assumption that fractional reserve banks can only
issue inside money as liabilities which they have to back with a fraction α
in outside money. Now suppose they also have the possibility to issue non-
monetary debt (debt not used as money in the first market at interest i′d) which
they don’t need to back with outside money. The only agents who could hold
this debt are the sellers who have idle cash after the preference shock but don’t
need money in the first market. In fact, if i′d > id they would prefer depositing
their cash in the bank against non-monetary debt than against acquiring inside
money. Suppose this holds so there is a demand for this debt and denote d′ as
cash deposits against non-monetary debt (per buyer). The bank problem now
reads:
max
l,d,d′
= d+ d′ + l(1 + i)− (l + d)(1 + id)− d′(1 + i′d)
s.t. α(l + d) ≤ d+ d′
As can be seen from the constraint non-monetary debt has the advantage for
the bank that it increases cash holdings without increasing inside money (which
would trigger further cash holdings). Thus loans can increase by 1/α at the
margin with non-monetary debt while in the case of deposits against inside
money they can only increase by (1− α)/α. If for example α = 0.5 a marginal
cash deposit against non-monetary debt increases loan capacity by 2 but a cash
deposit against inside money only by 1. The disadvantage of non-monetary debt
are the higher costs since i′d > id.
As before if i > id and id, i
′
d > 0 the constraint must bind and we can rewrite
the objective function:
max
d,d′
d
α
(α+ (1− α)(1 + i)− (1 + id)) + d
′
α
(α+ (1 + i)− α(1 + i′d)− (1 + id))
Thus if both types of debt are used and we apply free entry (zero profits) we get
again that the interest rate on inside money is a weighted average of the return
on outside money and loans (5):
1 + id = α+ (1− α)(1 + i)
And the interest rate on non-monetary debt must satisfy (the last step follows
from applying (5):
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1 + i′d = 1 +
1 + i
α
− 1 + id
α
= 1 + i > 1 + id (40)
Thus if the interest on inside money is this weighted average the bank can pay
a higher interest rate equal to the loan rate on non-monetary debt and there
is no spread. Thus we see i′d > id must hold. This interest rate structure has
interesting implications for the model. We know the seller will deposit against
non-monetary debt if i′d > id. Thus the marginal value of outside money of a
seller (29) is now
V ′s (m) = φ(1 + i
′
d) (41)
and optimal outside money holdings (30) solve:
φ = βφ+1[(1− s)(1 + i+1) + s(1 + i′d+1)]. (42)
Thus in equilibrium we get the equivalent to (32)as:
γ
β
= (1− s)(1 + i) + s(1 + id) = 1 + i = 1 + i′d (43)
Thus as in the basic model without preference shock in section 3 the loan rate
is equal to the inflation tax and independent of α. This is in contrast to the
model with only inside money. Since (5) also holds we get the same equilibrium
interest rate on inside money (20) and the same equilibrium allocation (22) as
in the model without preference shock:
u′(qb)
c′( 1−ss qb)
=
γ/β
(1− α)γ/β + α (44)
From this we can draw the following conclusions:
Proposition 5. Suppose holding money is costly (i.e. γ > β) and the reserve
constraint is interior (i.e. α ∈ (0, 1)), then there is a unique stationary equilib-
rium of an economy with banks, inside money and non-monetary debt in which:
i) first market consumption solves (44)and equals the allocation without pref-
erence shock in proposition 1.
ii) the allocation is better than in an economy with only inside money in propo-
sition 2.
iii) the allocation is better than the narrow banking allocation in proposition 3
and converges to this allocation as α→ 1.
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With two types of debt the threshold result from the economy with only in-
side money in proposition 2 vanishes and fractional reserve banking dominates
narrow banking as in the basic model in section 3. The intuition is the fol-
lowing: With only inside money narrow banking had the advantage of a better
insurance against liquidity risk because sellers were perfectly compensated for
the inflation tax on the cash they acquired whereas under fractional reserve
banking they were not. This advantage disappears now because non-monetary
debt also perfectly compensates the sellers against the inflation tax. It pays an
interest rate equal to the inflation tax in equilibrium. With two types of debt
also fractional reserve banking offers perfect insurance against liquidity risk.
Finally a few remarks on the interpretation of the model with α = 1 as a narrow
banking system. If we write the bank problem with α = 1 it becomes:
max
l,d,d′
= d+ d′ + l(1 + i)− (l + d)(1 + id)− d′(1 + i′d)
s.t. l ≤ d′
One can see from the objective function that banks only accept cash deposits
for inside money d if they have to pay zero interest, i.e. if id = 0. Otherwise
they would set d = 0. One can also see from the constraint that the capacity
to make loans in inside money is determined by the cash deposits against non-
monetary debt d′. These deposits increase outside money holdings of banks.
Thus even if banks have to back inside money one-to-one with outside money
they can issue inside money over loans if they get additional cash deposits. Now
suppose buyers prefer inside money over outside money even if id = 0 and both
types of money are exact substitutes. In this case there would still be a demand
for cash deposits against inside money from buyers after the preference shock.
Going with this scenario (and a binding constraint, i.e. l = d′) the zero profit
condition again gives us i = i′d. Thus a narrow bank with these two types of
debt has outside money holdings of d′ + d which fully back the issued inside
money holdings d+ l since l = d′. And she has loans in inside money l financed
by non-monetary debt d′. Inside money pays zero interest but non-monetary
debt is remunerated at the same interest rate as inside money loans. Thus we
are at the same allocation as in the narrow banking economy in section 4.3.
5 conclusion
The specific focus of this paper points to various extensions which could be
addressed in further work. First: the models presented here neglects the fun-
damental role of banks in capital allocation and investment as it is essentially
a model of efficient liquidity provision and allocation. Second: it could be in-
teresting to quantify the welfare gains from inside money creation. Some quan-
titative estimates from New Monetarist models are available. They could be
complemented with a quantitative estimate of this model. Third: The analysis
is embedded in an environment of perfect competition. This aligns the private
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interest of banks with social welfare. But e.g. the discussion of the desirability
of private seignorage by banks is impossible in a model where banks make zero
profits. Fourth: the analysis abstracts from the fragility of fractional reserve
banking systems. But a complete comparison between the two banking systems
should include it.
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Appendix A
A.1 Economy with only outside money
Rocheteau and Nosal [2017] (p.138) show there exists a unique stationary equi-
librium where all buyers and sellers have access to the first market (i.e. σ = 1
in their model) if γ > β which solves:
u′(qb)
c′(qs)
=
γ
β
(45)
For a positive inflation tax (γ > β) the allocation is inefficient and the ineffi-
ciency increases in the inflation tax. To see this note that under the assumptions
made on preferences, especially the concavity of u(q), the LHS of 45 u
′(q)
c′(q) de-
creases in q:
d(u
′(q)
c′(q) )
dq
=
u′′(q)c′(q)− u′(q)c′′(q)
c′(q)2
< 0 (46)
So if γ/β > 1 it must be that q < q∗ given by (1).
A.2 a model with early redemptions
So far the need for banks to hold outside money was motivated by the assump-
tion that clearing and settling the transactions with inside money in the first
market takes outside money and that this need is proportional to the inside
money used (α). This was a shortcut because the concrete clearing/settlement
process was not modelled. In this section I build a model building on Williamson
[2012] where the outside money holdings of banks serve a deeper purpose. As in
the basic model buyers acquire inside money in the second market. Afterwards
buyers either go to a non-monitored meeting with probability pi where they can
only use outside money. Or with the inverse probability they go to a moni-
tored meeting where they can use inside money. As before buyers acquire inside
money by depositing cash and borrowing in the second market. But since they
may need cash if they go to a non-monitored meeting the bank allows for early
redemptions. After knowing the type of meetings (at the beginning of the first
market) buyers can redeem inside money into outside money at interest rate
id1. Inside money which is not redeemed early will be redeemed in the following
second market at the interest rate id2 as before. Banks thus hold outside money
because some buyers need it in the first market and want to redeem their inside
money holdings early.
Introducing early redemptions gives banks more flexibility in the interest rates
they can pay in the second market, depending on how many buyers redeem early
at at what conditions. The basic message from the sections before is repeated
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and refined in this section. In general, more inside money creation is beneficial
also in this framework because it increases the return on inside money.
As in Williamson [2012] I assume take-it-or-leave-it offers by buyers, a unit
mass of buyers and sellers and linear disutility of working in the first market,
c(q) = q for sellers. I also assume −q u′′(q)u′(q) < 1 and more specifically u(q) = q
1−σ
1−σ
with σ < 1). Let the amount consumed in a non-monitored meeting be qc (for
”cash”) and q in a monitored meeting. nc (n′) are the amounts of inside money
a buyer does not redeem in a non-monitored (monitored) meeting. The problem
of a representative buyer can then be written as:
max
d,l,nc≥0,n′≥0
−φd+ pi[u(βφ+1(d+ l − nc)(1 + id1)) + βφ+1nc(1 + id2)] (47)
(1− pi)[u(βφ+1(d+ l − n′)(1 + id2)) + βφ+1n′(1 + id2)]
−βφ+1l(1 + i)
A buyer works to acquire outside money and deposit it in the bank (d) or she
might borrow inside money (l). In a non-monitored meeting the buyer redeems
d+ l−nc units of inside money for cash at rate 1+ id1. The value of this outside
money is βφ+1(d + l − nc)(1 + id1) for a seller in the next second market and
since we assume take-it-or-leave-it offers by buyers this is exactly the amount
produced. In the case of a monitored meeting the buyer uses inside money to pay
the seller where the marginal value in the next second market is βφ+1(1 + id2).
We can distinguish four possible cases solving this problem:
a) costless inside money (id1 < id2 = i): In this case inside money is costless
to hold and the buyer holds so much that he is unconstrained in both types of
meetings. The unconstrained consumption levels are:
u′(q˜c) =
1 + id2
1 + id1
, u′(q∗) = 1 (48)
i.e. in the non-monitored meeting the buyer wants to consume q˜c and in the
monitored meeting he consumes the first best quantity q∗. The return on inside
money equals marginal costs 1 + id2 = 1 + i =
φ
βφ+1
and the buyer doesn’t use
all his inside money in both types of meetings (nc, n′ > 0). The amount of real
inside money holdings βφ+1n is not determined and must lie in (
q∗
1+id2
,∞).24
Defining r = (n − nc)/n as the redemption rate in the first market, i.e. the
fraction of inside money redeemed by buyers in the non-monitored meeting, we
must have also have r = q˜
c
βφ+1n(1+id1)
∈ ( q˜c(1+id2)(1+id1)q∗ , 0).
b) medium return on inside money (id1, i˜d2 < id2 < i): In this case inside money
is costly to hold (id2 < i) but the return is still high enough that buyers are
24To be unconstrained in the monitored meeting a buyer needs q∗/(1 + id2) units of real
inside money. To be unconstrained in the non-monitored meeting the buyer needs q˜c/(1+id1).
With σ < 1 we have q˜c/(1 + id1) < q
∗/(1 + id2) and thus buyers need less real inside money
to be unconstrained in the non-monitored meeting.
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unconstrained in the non-monitored meetings, i.e. qc = q˜c and nc > 0 but
constrained in the monitored ones (n′ = 0). The consumption levels are:
u′(q˜c) =
1 + id2
1 + id1
, u′(q) =
1 + i− pi(1 + id2)
(1− pi)(1 + id2) (49)
and real inside money holdings solve βφ+1n = q/(1 + id2). The redemption rate
is r = q˜
c(1+id2)
q(1+id1)
. Note that real inside money holdings increase in the return
on inside money id2. Thus we can find a lower bound on id2 where real inside
money holdings just equal q˜c when all inside money is redeemed i.e. when r = 1.
This threshold solves:
βφ+1n(1 + id1) =
q
1 + i˜d2
(1 + id1) = q˜ (50)
c) low return on inside money (id1 < id2 < i˜d2 < i): In this case the return on
inside money is so low that buyers are constrained in both types of meetings
(nc = n′ = 0). The consumption levels and real inside money holdings solve:
piu′(qc)(1 + id1) + (1− pi)u′(q)(1 + id2) = 1 + i (51)
qc = βφ+1n(1 + id1) , q = βφ+1n(1 + id2)
which yields:
βφ+1n =
(pi(1 + id1)1−σ + (1− pi)(1 + id2)1−σ
1 + i
)1/σ
(52)
d) low return on inside money without spread (id1 = id2 < i): In this case
inside money is costly to hold and its return is the same when redeemed early
or late. This implies buyers are constrained in both types and consumption in
both meetings is the same solving
u′(q) =
1 + i
1 + id
(53)
with real inside money holdings βφ+1n = q/(1 + id).
In any of these cases the indifference condition between the two ways of acquiring
inside money (borrowing and depositing cash, (9)) must hold as in the basic
model:
φ
φ+1
1
β
= 1 + i+1 (54)
Also, the following relationship between the interest rates must hold in any
equilibrium:
0 ≤ id1 ≤ id2 ≤ i (55)
The inequalities ensure that buyers prefer using inside money, that only buyers
going to a non-monitored meeting redeem early and that the solution for real
inside money holdings is bounded.
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bank problem: The bank maximizes total cash profits taking the redemption rate
r as given. Total redemptions before the first market are given by pirn(1+id1)
25
and this needs to be smaller or equal to d, the total amount of cash deposits.
This constraint is similar to the reserve constraint in the model before. I also
introduce a quantity constraint.I assume the monitoring/enforcement technol-
ogy of banks for loans is imperfect and loans cannot be bigger than a threshold
value l¯.26 The problem of the bank is:
max
l,d
= d− pirn(1 + id1) + l(1 + i)− (n− pirn)(1 + id2)
s.t. pirn(1 + id1) ≤ d, l ≤ l¯
We see redemptions influence the bank problem in two ways (compare it with2).
It decreases outside money holdings and it decreases the outstanding inside
money of banks. Thus it both decreases assets and liabilities. We can reformu-
late the objective function as follows:
l(i− pirid1 + (1− pir)id2)− d(pirid1 + (1− pir)id2)
Thus if 0 < pirid1+(1−pir)id2 < i the bank wants to set loans as high as possible
and cash deposits as low as possible. This implies both constraints should bind
and we get:
l¯ =
1− pir(1 + id1)
pir(1 + id1)
d (56)
and the zero profit condition implies:
1 + id2 =
1− pir(1 + id1)
1− pir (1 + i) (57)
Now consider the case when the first constraint does not bind. In this case
the bank holds more outside money than she needs for redemptions in the non-
monitored meetings. We know if pirid1 + (1− pir)id2 > 0 the bank wants to set
d as low as possible because she makes losses by holding outside money. Thus
the bank will only accept excess reserves if pirid1 + (1− pir)id2 = 0, i.e. holding
outside money has no costs. Then, zero profits would require the loan rate to
come down to the same level, i.e. i = 0. But since the indifference condition (54)
must hold, this can never be an equilibrium because the inflation tax is above
25We consider a large bank with lots of buyers where the fraction of buyers going to a
non-monitored meeting is approximately pi.
26This is to make the model comparable to Williamson [2012]. In Williamsons model buyers
deposit goods in banks and banks invest them into outside money and nominal government
bonds. The government bonds can be used as means of payment in monitored meetings
(they serve a very similar role to loans/private debt in my model). There is also a quantity
constraint which steers the aggregate issuance of government bonds, δ = M
M+B
. Note that
this constraint is very similar to the α = M
M+L
constraint in the basic model which steers the
composition of outside and inside money.
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1. If the loan rate lies below the inflation tax, agents would not be willing to
deposit outside money in the bank. But if i > 0 and pirid1 + (1 − pir)id2 = 0
banks make positive profits in equilibrium. One can avoid this problem by
assuming that depositing and borrowing are coupled, i.e. buyers always deposit
and borrow at the same bank. Then it makes sense for banks to compete for
new depositors/borrowers in a situation where i > 0 and pirid1 +(1−pir)id2 = 0
and thus pirid1 + (1 − pir)id2 ultimately increases to a level where banks again
make zero profits. This is achieved when
(i− pirid1 + (1− pir)id2)l¯ = (pirid1 + (1− pir)id2)d (58)
Thus the equilibrium conditions for banks with excess reserves are given by
l = l¯ (given i > pirid1 + (1−pir)id2 still holds), (58) and d > pirn(1 + id1) which
implies
1 + id2 <
1− pir(1 + id1)
1− pir (1 + i) (59)
stationary equilibrium: As usual stationarity implies γ = φ/φ+1 and thus the
loan rate must equal the inflation tax or 1 + i = γ/β from (54) as in the normal
model. Also market clearing for outside money implies d = M . Thus the
aggregate ratio of outside to inside money under a binding borrowing constraint
is fixed and we can define this ratio as α¯27
α¯ =
M
M + l¯
We can rewrite equilibrium interest rates without excess reserves using (56) and
(57) as
1 + id1 =
α¯
pir
(60)
1 + id2 =
(1− α¯)(1 + i)
1− pir
With excess reserves using (58) we get:
pir(1 + id1) + (1− pir)(1 + id2) = α¯+ (1− α¯)(1 + i) (61)
and we need α¯ > pir(1 + id1).
We can now characterize the four equilibria:
a) equilibrium with costless and plentiful inside money : In this equilibrium inside
money is costless to hold (id2 = i). Therefore it must be from (60) that α¯ = pir
and id1 = 0, i.e. the interest rate for early redemptions is zero. Given these
interest rates equilibrium consumption in both types of meetings solves:
u′(q˜c) = γ/β , u′(q∗) = 1
27Note the inverse relation between borrowing constraints and α¯ if the borrowing constraints
are tight (l¯ is low) α¯ is high and the other way round.
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Since q˜c = βφ+1rn =
βφ+1α¯n
pi =
βφ+1M
pi real outside money holdings are given
by βφ+1M = piq˜
c. We also know real inside money holdings βφ+1n must be at
least q
∗
γ/β . Thus for existence of this equilibrium α¯ must solve
βφ+1n =
βφ+1M
α¯
≥ q
∗
γ/β
α¯ ≤ piq˜
c(γ/β)
q∗
= α∗ < pi (62)
which exists for α¯ ∈ (0, α∗).
In this equilibrium inside money is plentiful. The lending technology of the
bank is very good (l¯ is high and α¯ is low) so banks can issue a lot of inside
money which allows them to pay a return on inside money which makes it
costless to hold. Note that in this equilibrium inside money is neutral. α¯ has no
effect on consumption in the two types of meetings as long as it satisfies (62).
So the quantity theory holds. The allocation is not neutral to changes in the
inflation tax however. A higher inflation tax γ/β decreases real outside money
holdings of banks and thus consumption in non-monitored meetings. A higher
inflation tax also decreases α∗ and thus narrows the range of the equilibrium.
This equilibrium is equivalent to the plentiful interest bearing asset case in
Williamson [2012].
b) equilibrium with medium return on inside money : In this equilibrium buyers
are unconstrained in the non-monitored meeting because the return on inside
money is quite high (˜id2 < id2 < i) so they prefer keeping some inside money
and redeem it in the second market only. This also implies the redemption rate
r is below 1. In the monitored meetings buyers are still constrained because
id2 < i and inside money is costly to hold. This equilibrium is pinned down by
six equations in (q, q˜c, id1, id2, r, βφ+1n):
u′(q˜c) =
1 + id2
1 + id1
, u′(q) =
1 + i− pi(1 + id2)
(1− pi)(1 + id2) , (63)
(60), βφ+1n = q/(1 + id2) and r =
q˜c(1+id2)
q(1+id1)
. We can reduce them to one
equation which implicitly defines id2:
(1− pi)(1 + id2)2−σ − (1− pi)(1− α)(1 + i)(1 + id2)1−σ
+piσ+1α1−σ(1 + id2)− piσα1−σ(1 + i) = 0 (64)
We know the equilibrium should exist for i˜d2 < i where i˜d2 is pinned down by
(50) with a redemption rate of 1. We can thus define a threshold α˜ which solves
(50) for interest rates satisfying (60) with r = 1. Rewriting (50) we get:
(1 + id2
1 + id1
)1−σ
=
1 + i− pi(1 + id2)
(1− pi)(1 + id2) (65)
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Suppose α˜ is pi. From (60) we would then get id2 = i and id1 = 0. Clearly this
violates (65). We need i˜d2 < i and ergo α˜ > pi. Now suppose α˜ = α where
α =
pi(γ/β)
1− pi + pi(γ/β) (66)
is the value where both interest rates are equal (id2 = id1 = id), according to
(60) with r = 1. Also then (65) is violated and we need α˜ < α or i˜d2 > id. Thus
we must have α˜ ∈ (α, pi) and since α∗ < pi from (..) we must have α˜ < α∗ and
the interval (α∗, α˜) is non-empty.
(64) is consistent with these two boundary conditions. Also, using the implicit
function theorem it can be shown that (64) implies d(1 + id2)/dα < 0 for id2 ∈
(˜id2, i). As α¯ decreases from α˜ to α
∗ id2 increases from i˜d2 to i. Given this
we can deduce the behaviour of the other variables in equilibrium. At α˜ id1 >
0 and at α∗ id1 = 0 thus the interest rate for early redemptions decreases.
The redemption rate r is 1 at α˜ and q˜
c(γ/β)
q∗ < 1 at α
∗ thus it also decreases.
Consumption in the monitored meeting increases in id2 from (63) and thus
increases as α¯ goes to α∗. On the other hand consumption in the non-monitored
meeting decreases as α¯ decreases to α∗.
What happens to expected welfare? Denoting the optimal choice of real inside
money holdings as n∗ and the optimal redemption rate as r∗ we can rewrite
(47):
Ub(n
∗, r∗) = −n∗(1 + i) + piu(n∗r∗(1 + id1)) + pin∗(1− r∗)(1 + id2)
+(1− pi)u(n∗(1 + id2))
Using (57) to substitute for 1 + id1 and applying the envelope theorem:
dUb(n
∗, r∗)
d(1 + id2)
> 0 ↔ (1 + i)(1 + id1)
1 + id2
>
1− pir∗
(1 + i)/(1 + id2)− pir∗
which holds for i > id2, id1 > 0. Thus as α¯ decreases from α˜ to α
∗ and id2
increases from i˜d2 to i expected welfare increases (at id2 = i and id1 = 0 the
derivative is zero). Although buyers in non-monitored meetings loose and buyers
in monitored meetings gain both gain in expected terms. And more inside money
(lower α¯) is beneficial in this equilibrium.28
c) equilibrium with low return and scarce inside money : In this equilibrium
id1 < id2 < i˜d2 < i and buyers are constrained in both types of meetings. The
equilibrium is pinned down by (51) and (60) with r = 1. The conditions on the
interest rates then tell us we need α¯ < α˜ and α¯ > α. Thus it exists in the range
α¯ ∈ (α, α˜).
Using (52) one can show that d(βφ+1n)dα < 0 for α¯ ∈ (α, α˜) and thus dqdα < 0. Thus
if we decrease α¯ from α to α˜ real inside money holdings and consumption in
28This equilibrium does not exist in Williamson [2012] since he does not consider inside
money and redemptions explicitly.
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the monitored meeting increase. The positive effects on inside money holdings
from the increase in id1 are overcompensated by the negative effects over the
decrease in id2. The effect on consumption in the non-monitored meeting is not
clear and depends on the level of the inflation tax. If the inflation tax is not too
high29 a lower α¯ decreases consumption in the non-monitored market. In this
case the decreasing effects from the lower interest rate id1 overcompensate the
increasing effects from higher real inside money holdings.
Again denoting optimal real inside money holdings as n∗ indirect buyer utility
can be written as:
Uc(n
∗) = −n∗(1 + i) + piu(n∗(1 + id1)) + (1− pi)u(n∗(1 + id2))
Using (57) to substitute for 1 + id1 and applying the envelope theorem we see
that:
dUc(n
∗)
d(1 + id2)
> 0 ↔ u
′(qc)
u′(q)
< 1 + i ↔ 1 + id2
1 + id1
< (1 + i)1/σ
which must hold for id2 < i. As we decrease α¯ (increase id2) expected welfare
increases in this equilibrium (although also here buyers in the non-monitored
meetings might loose). This also implies that equilibrium b) dominates equi-
librium c) in terms of welfare. This equilibrium is analogue to the equilibrium
with scarce interest bearing assets in Williamson [2012]. In his model monitored
buyers (and expected) welfare also increase with more bonds issued (a lower α¯).
The consumption of uyers in non-monitored meetings however, is unaffected
from issuing more bonds. Bonds are only used in monitored meetings and in-
creasing the quantity (and the return) of bonds by decreasing α¯ only benefits
monitored buyers. There are no spillover effects.
d) equilibrium with excess reserves: In this equilibrium id1 = id2 = id and
buyers are constrained in both markets. We know interest rates are equal at
α¯ = α. If α¯ > α and (60) holds we would get id1 > id2 which violates our
assumptions on the interest rates. Thus when α¯ > α banks cannot pay out all
outside money in the non-monitored meeting and we must have excess reserves
(the first constraint of the bank must be slack). Using id1 = id2 = id on (61):
1 + id = α¯+ (1− α¯)(1 + i) (67)
Thus this equilibrium solves (53) and (67) and βφ+1n = q/(1+ id) in α¯ ∈ (α, 1).
Note that (67) is exactly the same expression we got in the basic model (5).
The interest rate on inside money is a weighted average of the return on outside
money and the return on loans. Since consumption in monitored and non-
monitored meetings is also identical to the basic model we get exactly the same
expression as (22) (with a linear disutility of working for sellers, i.e. c′(qs) = 1)
u′(q) =
1 + i
1 + id
=
γ/β
(1− α)γ/β + α (68)
29Concretely if γ/β <
pi+(1−pi)σ
pi(1−σ) .
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The welfare implications are also identical to the basic model. The allocation
is non-neutral with respect to α¯. The higher α¯ (the less inside money) the
lower welfare.30 Finally note that a as in the basic model a narrow banking
system would be when α¯ = 1 or l¯ = 0 i.e. banks can do no lending. As in the
basic model outside and inside money are perfect substitutes and the question
whether buyers will go to a monitored or a non-monitored meeting is irrelevant
because both means of payment are equivalent. The results from the basic
models in terms of welfare also apply here. Fractional reserve banking with
α¯ < 1 dominates narrow banking where consumption in both types of meetings
solves u′(q) = γ/β.
The following figures summarize the four equilibria. The more elaborate model
repeats and refines the basic message from the sections before. As in the basic
model in equilibria b), c), d) more inside money creation (a lower α¯) is beneficial
because it increases the return on inside money which compensates agents for
the inflation tax. However, and this is the first refinement, in equilibria b) and
c) more inside money creates winners and losers. Although in expected terms
buyers are better of, they may lose in the non-monitored meetings. Marginal
utility is higher when interest payments are concentrated on the monitored
meetings and thus id2 increases and interest payments in the non-monitored
meetings (id1) shrinks. The second refinement is that in equilibrium a) when
inside money creation is sufficiently easy (α¯ < α∗) inside money has no real
effects anymore. Thus we loose the non-neutrality result. The refined model
offers also a reinterpretation of the basic model as a situation where banks
are very constrained in their lending and are forced to hold excess reserves in
equilibrium.
30These results are in contrast to Williamson [2012] who gets a ”liquidity trap” equilibrium
in the analogue situation where the rate of return on outside money and bonds are equal. In
his model the return on bonds is not linked to the inflation tax as the loan rate is here over
the indifference condition (54). Thus if bonds are very scarce, their return would be below the
return on outside money if only bonds were used in the monitored meeting. Therefore agents
want to use outside money in both meetings and the returns of bonds and outside money
and the consumption levels must be equalized. But this implies α¯ has no real effects in this
equilibrium in his model.
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A.3 use of inside and outside money in the first market
Let pc denote the price of the first-market-consumption good q in outside money.
For outside money to be accepted besides inside money, agents must be indiffer-
ent between using inside or outside money. For sellers, indifference means they
could produce the same amount qs paid with either means of payment. If they
work for cash their marginal utility is pcφ and if they work for inside money
pφ(1 + id) so to be indifferent the ratio of prices must be
pc
p
= 1 + id
which is > 1 if id > 0. Sellers need to be compensated with a higher price for
sales against cash. Indifference for buyers means they can consume the same
amount qb in the first market with outside or inside money for the same disutility
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of working to acquire it in the second market before. So they would acquire m
units of outside money such that:
m/pc = n/p = qb (69)
But since the price of outside money in the first market is higher (pc > p) when
sellers are indifferent, this impliesm > n i.e. buyers need to acquire more outside
money than outside money to consume the same amount of goods. However,
both means of payment have the same marginal costs φ in the second market
(wlog we can assume a buyer would only deposit cash to acquire inside money).
Thus the costs of acquiring m units of outside money are strictly higher than
the costs of acquiring n units of inside money and a buyer would strictly prefer
to use inside money over outside money in the first market.
A.4 Economy with outside money and preference shock
In an economy without banks the value of an additional unit of cash for a buyer
in t + 1 is u
′(qb+1)
p+1
and for a seller just φ+1 since he cannot deposit and earn
interest. Thus optimal cash holdings (26) for an agent in this economy solve:
φ = β[(1− s)u
′(qb+1)
p+1
+ sφ+1].
Optimal production against cash is given by c′(qs) = pφ. Thus the stationarity
equilibrium consumption in the first market without banks q˜b solves:
u′(qb)
c′( 1−ss qb)
=
γ/β − s
1− s . (70)
We see the RHS of equation (70) is equal to the RHS of 45 if s = 0 (i.e. there
is no preference shock) and that it is increasing in s. By the same logic as in
A.1 we can thus conclude that if s > 0 the allocation is worse than in 45 and
the inefficiency increases in s.
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Appendix B
B.1 proof of proposition 1
Proof. I first show that the conjectures made to derive (22) are indeed correct
in equilibrium for α ∈ (0, 1) and γ > β. The conjectures were:
1. i > id > 0 and the bank reserve constraint binds
2. sellers don’t acquire inside money
3. buyers are liquidity constrained
The first conjecture is easily verified by looking at the expressions for optimal
interest rates in equilibrium, (20). For an interior α and a positive inflation tax
i > id > 0 holds in equilibrium and thus the bank constraint binds.
The second conjecture: Since for a seller inside money has no liquidity value
and his preferences in the second market are quasi-linear he will not acquire
inside money if the marginal costs φ are higher than the discounted marginal
benefits βφ+1(1 + id+1) In equilibrium this is satisfied if the interest on inside
money is below the inflation tax, 1 + id < γ/β and this condition also holds for
α ∈ (0, 1) and γ > β according to (20). Also, a seller will not acquire inside
money by borrowing if the marginal costs φ+1(1 + i+1) are higher than the
marginal benefits φ+1(1 + id+1) or in other words if i > id. Thus the conditions
on interest rates shown to be true in equilibrium in conjecture 1 also imply
conjecture 2.
To verify the third conjecture we see from optimal consumption of the buyer
(15) that a buyer is liquidity constrained if qb < q
∗. In equilibrium this is
equivalent to saying that the qb given by (22) is inefficient (below q
∗) or that
the RHS of (22) is above 1 (see A.1). Since the RHS of (22) can also be written
as the ratio between (gross) loan and inside money rate u
′(qb)
c′(qs)
= 1+i1+id qb < q
∗
holds if i > id which was already shown to be true in conjecture 1. This also
establishes the inefficiency of the allocation statet in ii).
Next I show that given that the buyer is liquidity constrained in equilibrium,
i.e. qb = n/p, the problem in (6) is concave in cash deposits d and loans l and
thus the first order conditions for optimal inside money holdings (7) uniquely
maximize the problem in (6). Problem (6) writes for a liquidity constrained
buyer:
W (0, l−1) = max
x,d,l
U(x)− l−1φ(1 + i)− x− φd+ φτ + β(u(d+ l
p+1
)− lφ+1(1 + i+1))
which is concave in d and l by the concavity of u(q). Thus the solution in (22)
is unique.
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For the comparative statics of the equilibrium allocation stated in ii) I refer to
A.1 where I showed that the closer the RHS of (22) to 1 the better for welfare.
Thus since
∂(
u′(qb)
c′(qs) )
∂γ/β > 0 and
∂(
u′(qb)
c′(qs) )
∂α > 0 the RHS of (22) increases both in the
inflation tax an in α which decreases welfare.
To see that the allocation in (22) is better than the allocation without inside
money creation (45) stated in iii) note that the RHS of (22) can be written
as γ/β 11+i which is below γ/β (the RHS of (45) if interest on inside money
is positive which is true in this economy. The results iv) and v) are simply
obtained by sticking in the limit values of α (0, 1) into the RHS of 22.

B.2 proof of proposition 2
Proof. The only additional conjecture in the model from section 4 compared to
section 3 is that if we are in an equilibrium where buyers borrow it is optimal
for them to borrow. To verify this it must be that the marginal utility if buyers
don’t borrow u′(m/p)1/p is bigger than the marginal costs of borrowing φ(1+ i)
or:
u′(
m
p
) > φ(1 + i)p = u′(
m+ l
p
)
which holds if l > 0. Thus it is optimal for buyers to borrow additional inside
money in this equilibrium. The other conjectures are the same as in section 3
and the proof that (35) uniquely solves the model in section 4 follows the same
steps as the proof for the model without preference shock above.
ii): Since i > id follows also here that the RHS of (35) is > 1 and thus q <
q∗. The only new element in the comparative statics is the effect of s. Since
∂(
u′(qb)
c′(qs) )
∂s > 0 the RHS of (35) increases in s which decreases welfare by the same
logic as above.
iii): Note that as s goes to zero the allocation given by (35) converges to
the allocation without preference shock (22). And since increasing s decreases
welfare the allocation in the basic model is strictly better.
iv): Compare the RHS of (70) with the RHS of (35):
γ/β − s
1− s ...
γ/β − αs
(1− α)γ/β + α(1− s)
↔
c− s > 1− s
to see that the former is bigger and thus welfare is strictly higher in the fractional
reserve banking economy than in the economy without banks. Also see that both
RHS are equal if α = 1. To get the result from v) stick in α = 0 in the RHS of
(35) and see that it equals 1 which is equivalent to the FB-allocation in (1).
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B.3 proof of proposition 3
Proof. See the proof of proposition 1 in BCW.
iv): The allocation with outside money and preference shock without banks is
given by (A.4):
u′(qb)
c′( 1−ss qb)
=
γ/β − s
1− s .
T show that this allocation is worse than the allocation in the narrow banking
economy we need:
u′(qb)
c′( 1−ss qb)
=
γ/β − s
1− s >
γ
β
=
u′(qNBb )
c′( 1−ss q
NB
b )
Which is true for any s > 0.

B.4 proof of proposition 4
Proof. Finding α˜ requires equalizing the right-hand sides of (39) and (35) thus
solving
γ
β
=
γ/β − α˜s
(1− α˜)γ/β + α˜(1− s)
which yields
α˜ =
γ/β
γ/β + s

B.5 proof of proposition 5
All statements in the proposition have already been proved elsewhere. State-
ment ii) is equivalent to statement iii) in proposition 2.
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